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ABSTRACT
A growing number of countries are reforming their water allocation 
regimes through the use of economic instruments. This article analyzes 
the performance of economic instruments in water allocation reforms 
compared against their original design objectives in five European 
countries: England, France, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands. We 
identify the strengths of, barriers to and unintended consequences 
of economic instruments in the varying socio-economic, legal, 
institutional and biophysical context in each case study area, and 
use this evidence to draw out underlying common guidelines and 
recommendations. These lessons will help improve the effectiveness 
of future reforms while supporting more efficient water resources 
allocation.
Introduction
In many countries in Europe, population growth coupled with changing income distributions, 
and the longer-term threat due to human-induced climate change, is increasing competition 
for water resources, resulting in supply–demand imbalances (Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change, 2014). While new or enlarged water resource infrastructure (e.g. reservoirs, 
boreholes) to expand the supply base can assist in the short term, expansion will eventually 
exhaust the limited capacity of water resources to support new diversions at affordable 
prices, a process known as river basin closure (Falkenmark & Molden, 2008). Where the costs 
of expanding supply exceed the economic benefits of marginal uses, policy makers are 
expected to shift priorities towards making water withdrawals compatible with available 
resources (Randall, 1981). In this context, a growing number of countries are reforming their 
water allocation regimes – the set of laws, rules or common practices that determine who 
is able to use water resources, including how much they can abstract, for what purpose, and 
when and where withdrawals are permitted (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
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Development [OECD], 2015a). Economic instruments or incentives are expected to play a 
major role in these reforms (Lago, Mysiak, Gómez, Delacámara, & Maziotis, 2015).
According to the Dublin Principles, managing water as an economic good is instrumental 
in achieving efficient and equitable use and encouraging conservation and protection of 
water resources. Yet, water allocation regimes often distribute resources on the basis of 
historical rights or queueing (Chong & Sunding, 2006), and are plagued with rigidities (e.g. 
non-transferability), inconsistencies (e.g. due to lack of regulatory coordination) and infor-
mation gaps (e.g. environmental performance) (OECD, 2015a), which all together hinder the 
prioritization of uses in accordance with their economic value. This is particularly relevant 
in agriculture, the largest global water user and the sector where the marginal uses of water 
resources are most concentrated (Food and Agriculture Organization, 2013). As river basins 
close and economic and environmental impacts grow, existing water allocation regimes, 
which typically lack flexibility are no longer fit for purpose. This has led to attempts to improve 
their performance through the use of economic instruments (Gleick, 2002; Wutich et al., 
2014). Here we define economic instruments for water management as those incentives 
designed to align individual behaviour with the public objectives of achieving reliable quan-
tity and quality of water and mitigating water-related risks (Delacámara et al., 2014; Gómez, 
Pérez-Blanco, Adamson, & Loch, 2017; Lago et al., 2015). Incentive compatibility is thus key 
to their success (Delacámara, Gómez, & Maestu, 2015a). However, where private incentives 
conflict with water policy objectives, economic instruments can fail or even backfire. This is 
reported to be happening in Australia, where environmental flows have been reduced after 
the implementation of market incentives to enhance efficiency among commercial users 
(Connor & Kaczan, 2013), and in Spain, where subsidies for irrigation modernization have 
led to increased water consumption (Berbel, Gómez-Limon, & Gutiérrez-Martín, 2017; 
Rodríguez Díaz, Urrestarazu, Poyato, & Montesinos, 2012) and withdrawals (Gutiérrez-Martín 
& Gómez, 2011) rather than reducing demand.
This article reviews and assesses the design, implementation and achievements of eco-
nomic instruments in the context of water allocation reforms in Europe, to draw out useful 
insights and lessons to enhance their future uptake and performance. In a literature review, 
four key steps were undertaken. First, we reviewed major water allocation reforms to identify 
their specific objectives, focusing on five case studies in Europe, including Spain, Italy, the 
Netherlands, France and England. Each case study was critiqued qualitatively regarding: (1) 
existing pressures on freshwater resources; (2) the water regulatory framework, existing 
water allocation systems and recent reforms; (3) the use of economic instruments in the mix 
of water management arrangements; and (4) objectives and performance of their economic 
instruments. Second, we critically analyzed the role of economic instruments in achieving 
water allocation reform objectives in each case study. The analysis extended beyond the 
water charging and market mechanisms widely addressed in the literature to include vol-
untary agreements, buyback, subsidies and insurance. We then identified critical variables 
that enabled or prevented the adoption and success of economic instruments. Finally, while 
acknowledging that the design of water allocation is typically context-specific, we compared 
the strengths of, barriers to and unintended consequences of economic instruments across 
the varying socio-economic, legal, institutional and biophysical contexts to draw out under-
lying common guidelines and general recommendations. Lessons learned from this critical 
review are relevant not only to other European countries involved in a similar implementation 
process in the context of the European Water Framework Directive (WFD; European 
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Commission [EC], 2000), but also for other countries with interests in developing a deeper 
understanding of the strengths, weaknesses and implementation barriers of economic 
instruments.
European water policy and recent regulatory reforms
Water regulatory framework: the EU context
The use of economic instruments to promote economic efficiency in water resources man-
agement was one of the boldest recommendations of the WFD, with major implications for 
water management in Europe (Gómez-limón & Martín-Ortega, 2013). The use of economics 
thus transcends its traditional supportive role (funding) to become part of a transformational 
policy that overcomes incremental (e.g. grey infrastructure) responses in water management. 
Failure to integrate economic instruments in water reforms in Europe has been acknowl-
edged as one of the reasons for the under-achievement of the WFD objectives (EC, 2012a).
The WFD set out a new paradigm for EU water policy. The overarching goal of achieving 
‘good ecological status’ of water bodies was to be accomplished through a series of objectives 
that included preventing further deterioration of aquatic and water-dependent ecosystems; 
promoting sustainable water use based on a long-term protection of available resources; 
enhancing protection and improvement of the aquatic environment; ensuring the reduction 
of groundwater pollution; and contributing to mitigating the effects of floods and droughts. 
Management of European waters was to be implemented at a river basin scale (hydrological 
unit) through river basin management plans that detailed how the WFD objectives were to 
be attained for that specific basin within the required timescale.
Economic analysis and principles were set to play a key role in the transposition of the 
WFD to the specific characteristics of each member state, region or basin in the context of 
the Common Implementation Strategy (EC, 2003). In Article 5 (on economic analysis) and 
Article 9 (on pricing) the directive calls for sound economic analysis to support the devel-
opment of economic instruments to fund programmes of measures but also to affect the 
behaviour of individuals. For example, Article 9 states that ‘water-pricing policies provide 
adequate incentives for users to use water resource efficiently, and thereby contribute to 
the environmental objectives of this Directive’ (EC, 2000, p. 13). Levies, and by extension 
other economic instruments, are thus desirable not only for their contribution to cost recov-
ery and the enforcement of the polluter-pays principle but also for their ability to align 
individual decisions with the objective of achieving the good ecological status of European 
waters. Article 5 calls for an estimation of the costs of water services and an informed (eco-
nomic) assessment to find the most cost-effective combination of measures to achieve the 
objectives of the directive, which, according to Preamble 38 and Annex VI, shall use ‘economic 
instruments’.
The Blueprint to Safeguard Europe’s Water Resources (EC, 2012a) identified the insufficient 
use of economic instruments as a key reason for inadequate implementation and integration 
of water policy objectives, and highlighted that ‘not putting a price on a scarce resource like 
water can be regarded as an environmentally-harmful subsidy’. The blueprint also considered 
water markets as a tool that could help improve water-use efficiency and overcome water 
stress, provided that a cap on use was implemented and enforced. Periodic reports from the 
EU Action on Water Scarcity and Droughts identified some advances in the introduction of 
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water tariffs in a number of member states and the extension of metering devices in most 
of them, but noted that ‘economic instruments have not been widely used by Member States 
thus far’ (EC, 2007, p. 5; EC, 2011). Furthermore, important design flaws were present in those 
existing economic instruments, pointing towards a mismatch between the purpose and 
design of the instrument and the objectives of the directive (EC, 2012b). Although the EU 
regulatory background acknowledges the relevant role of economic instruments in achieving 
WFD objectives, performance assessments and EU institutional reports to date display a 
narrow focus on tariffs and disregard other economic instruments already in place in several 
countries (e.g. European Environment Agency [EEA], 2017), which equates economic instru-
ments to pricing). This narrow focus hinders the ability of European institutions to inform 
an efficient and effective water policy, which requires a sensible combination of (economic) 
instruments for water management adapted to the needs and characteristics of each basin 
(EC, 2012a).
EU institutions also have other means (beyond water policy) to underpin compliance 
with WFD objectives, notably agricultural policy. The EU allocates nearly 40% of its budget 
to agriculture, a sector that represents more than 50% of total water abstractions in southern 
Europe, rising to more than 80% in some regions (EC, 2017; EEA, 2009). The Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) 2014–2020 updated and strengthened its ‘second pillar’ (EC, 2005), 
acknowledging the provision of valuable public environmental goods and services by rural 
areas (European Union [EU], 2013a). This so-called greening of the CAP defined some funding 
available under the second pillar to be conditional on meeting environmental targets (includ-
ing those of the WFD); for example by ensuring that adequate charging mechanisms were 
in place where irrigation modernization investments were subsidized (EU, 2013a). The new 
CAP also introduced a strong ecological component in its ‘first pillar’, allocating part of the 
direct payments to those farmers who complied with predetermined environmental objec-
tives, and continued the decoupling of environmentally and socially harmful subsidies (EU, 
2013b). Other CAP initiatives such as the income stabilization tool foresee the subsidy of 
mutual funds to enhance the uptake of comprehensive insurance policies, which under 
some conditions can substitute for unsustainable withdrawals from natural capital (ground-
water) (EU, 2013a).
Pressures on water resources
Water availability is uneven across Europe. Whereas water scarcity and droughts have tradi-
tionally been an issue for some river basins in southern Mediterranean countries, flooding 
is regarded as the most important risk for the quantitative management of water resources 
in most central, eastern and northern countries. Nevertheless, the pressure on water resources 
is increasing due to changing patterns of consumption, ambitious environmental objectives 
and the initial impacts of a changing climate in many areas across Europe (Dai, 2013; EC, 
2011; EEA, 2012; Gudmundsson & Seneviratne, 2016; Prudhomme et al., 2014), with the 
Water Exploitation Index (‘mean annual total demand for freshwater divided by the long-
term average freshwater resources’, EEA, 2016) reaching more than 20% in some basins 
(Figure 1).
Water availability pressures are also gaining importance and government attention in 
northern and central Europe, as evidenced by recent water-allocation reforms in various 
member states (e.g. the UK: Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs [Defra], 2011). 
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The countries included in this review reflect different water resources challenges, which 
determine the ongoing evolution of the water abstraction licensing system and their relative 
maturity. In England, significant pressures on water resources affect both the aquatic envi-
ronment and available water supplies. Many catchments have little or no water available for 
additional abstraction licensing, and many abstractors face seasonal restrictions during dry 
periods (Environment Agency, 2008; Rey, Holman, & Knox, 2017). Resource availability is also 
becoming more variable (and less predictable) as the country is affected by more frequent 
drought episodes, with severe impacts in all sectors (Marsh, 2007; Rey et al., 2016). Drought 
and shortages in freshwater supply are also emerging in the Netherlands. Droughts have 
occurred in recent years (e.g. 1976, 2003, 2005, and 2011), with significant associated eco-
nomic impacts, which are expected to occur more frequently in future (Klijn, Van Velsen, Ter 
Maat, & Hunink, 2012; RIZA, 2005). At the same time, competition across water users is 
intensifying due to socio-economic and demographic developments, e.g., rising demand 
for electricity and irrigation water use (Klijn et al., 2012; RIZA, 2005).
In France, the water supply can meet the demand in most of the provinces in an average 
hydrological year. However, water stress is increasing, especially in the south, and this trend 
is expected to continue due to the impact of climate change and socio-economic develop-
ment (Giuntoli, Maugis, & Renard, 2012). In these areas, the increasing frequency of summer 
droughts means that irrigation water demand exceeds the supply almost every summer. 
Consequently, a growing number of provinces are now limiting water withdrawals through 
emergency measures – although the recurring nature of ‘emergencies’ may justify reforming 
the water allocation regime in over-abstracted areas (Ministère de l’écologie, de l’énergie, 
du développement [MEEDDAT], 2008).
Figure 1. map of Water exploitation Index (%) for european countries, summer 2014 (eea, 2016).
210    D. REY ET AL.
Water resources in Spain are limited and scarce and vary significantly from year to year 
(Garrote, Iglesias, & Flores, 2009). The high variability and uneven distribution of water and 
its scarcity throughout the country have led to intensive management of water resources, 
especially for agriculture, through water infrastructure investment (Estrela & Vargas, 2012). 
Demand is also rising due to demographic shifts, economic development, and lifestyle 
changes. Rising water demand is also a concern in Italy, where water use has risen steadily 
in recent decades. In some areas, the volume of authorized abstraction licenses already 
exceeds average water availability, although some is not used (sleeping licences) (Santato, 
Mysiak, & Pérez-Blanco, 2016). Water allocation mismanagement thus becomes more appar-
ent during periods of drought, which have become increasingly frequent since the turn of 
the century (Castellari et al., 2014).
Allocation systems, recent reforms and their objectives across case studies
The influence of European regulations and guidelines, coupled with a greater pressure on 
water resources, has motivated governments to rethink the way water has traditionally been 
allocated among competing sectors. This article focuses on five countries in Europe, each 
with different water availability problems, regulatory systems and allocation mechanisms 
(Table 1). Over the last two decades, these countries have reformed their water allocation 
systems, often after a major drought that highlighted the need for greater flexibility and 
efficiency (Figure 2). In each country, the case for implementing economic instruments for 
water allocation is increasing, playing a key role in current and planned allocation reforms.
Application of economic instruments to reform water allocation in Europe
The first fundamental theorem of welfare economics, which states that laissez-faire mar-
kets tend to a Pareto-optimal resources allocation, is often seen as an argument for 
non-intervention. Self-interest and free markets, it is argued, should be enough to drive 
the allocation of resources towards efficiency, according to Adam Smith’s (1776) ‘invisible 
hand’ hypothesis. This postulate renders policy intervention in resources (re)allocation, 
including water, unnecessary and even counterproductive (Mendelsohn, 2016). However, 
this construct also relies on several assumptions that do not often hold true in real-life 
markets. For example, imperfect information and transaction-cost problems mean that 
markets are far from Pareto-optimal (Stiglitz & Greenwald, 1986). Thus, laissez-faire mar-
kets typically lead to externalities, costs or benefits accruing to third parties. Moreover, 
even if all assumptions hold, Pareto-optimality is not the same as desirability. For example, 
Pareto-efficiency may lead to inequitable and biased allocations of resources to specific 
groups, raising distributive and ethical issues.
The second fundamental theorem of welfare economics states that advances in fairness 
and policy acceptability are not at odds with economic efficiency, and can be attained 
through lump-sum transfers that correct undesirable outcomes, such as biased property 
rights, while leaving all agents in the market better off (Kaldor-Hicks improvement). However, 
in other cases, barriers of varying nature prevent this. This is the case for deeply entrenched 
water rights as a result of existing laws, customs and actions by relevant groups of interest. 
Achieving the greatest collective good requires active management by an institutional agent 
capable of solving complex water-allocation problems, so that externalities are addressed, 
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economic outcomes are maximized, and overall water allotments are aligned with water 
policy objectives (McCann, 2013; Rausser, Swinnen, Zusman, & Approaches, 2011). Economic 
instruments are thus a means towards this goal. The following section analyzes how eco-
nomic instruments can contribute to achieving the objectives of water allocation reform in 
each case study (Table 2).
Water charges
In contrast to prices that are set in a market environment, water charges in the EU follow an 
administrative procedure that in many cases does not internalize the costs of the water 
infrastructure required to deliver the service – let alone environmental and resource costs. 
This is particularly evident in the irrigation sector, where implicit subsidies in the form of 
insufficient cost-recovery levels are widespread (EEA, 2013). As a result, water levies are 
insufficient to pass on the costs of externalities to users in Europe and elsewhere (EEA, 2013; 
OECD, 2009). Where cost-recovery levels are higher, this usually reflects the users’ ability to 
pay and typically has limited impact on withdrawals. For example, the Guadalquivir River 
basin has the highest (water infrastructure) cost-recovery ratio in Spain (98%) but displays 
an inelastic response to charges (Gutiérrez-Martín, Blanco, Gómez, & Berbel, 2014) and has 
one of the highest Water Exploitation Indices in Europe (Figure 1). This situation can be 
aggravated where revenues raised through water levies are not directed towards water 
policies that mitigate the negative impacts of over-allocation, as in Italy (Santato et al., 2016). 
Levies can be further reduced to incentivize the adoption of desirable water management 
arrangements, as in the development of the French Single Water Users’ Association 
(Organisme unique de gestion collective) (MEEDDAT, 2008). Such subsidies can ease insti-
tutional transformation and compliance with maximum abstractions, but they prevent the 
identification of the actual cost of water; in the longer term they may also delay adaptation 
to the risks of river basin closure (Colby & Bush, 1987).
Despite the issues identified above, growing adoption of metering devices underpinned 
by regulatory and planning instruments, and the empowerment of water users’ associations 
and collective management (e.g., Po River Basin Authority, Po River Basin Agency, 2003), has 
underpinned transition towards volumetric charging. In all five case studies, a growing num-
ber of water levies are defined in two tranches: one that reflects the fixed costs of water 
conveyance; and the other based on actual withdrawals and use (EEA, 2013). Metering also 
enables temporary levies on water use that charge abstractors in accordance with season 
(incremental charges), thus introducing incentives for water conservation during dry periods. 
This is the case in England and Wales, where abstraction charges are based on season – 
although this model is now transitioning towards charges based on reliability (Defra, 2016a). 
Evidence from Italy and Spain shows that higher cost-recovery levels are typically observed 
where collective water management is in place (Maestu, Del Villar, & Ministerio de Medio 
Ambiente, 2007; URBER, 2015), suggesting that the devolution of water management to 
users’ associations in countries such as France may have aided cost recovery. Conversely, 
higher charges constitute an additional cost, which may be rejected by farmers (Rinaudo & 
Hérivaux, 2014).
In 2012, the European Commission commenced infringement procedures against nine 
member states ‘for their narrow interpretation of the concept of water services’ (EC, 2012a, 
p. 10), which was allegedly ‘hindering progress in implementing cost recovery policies 
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beyond drinking water and sanitation’. However, the European Court of Justice ruled that 
member states may decide which economic instruments and design are to be implemented, 
as long as they meet WFD objectives (Jääskinen, 2014). This could be interpreted as recog-
nition of the role of instruments such as payment for ecosystem services (PES) or subsidies; 
but the polluter-pays principle pervades environmental legislation. This has not stopped 
widespread de facto reliance on a benefit-based approach to address environmental chal-
lenges, especially through subsidies. Mature water economies with inelastic supply often 
witness autonomous adaptation and water reallocation to more productive uses, as growing 
demand limits water availability. At this point, though, charges may be a less cost-effective 
tool in addressing (urgent) scarcity problems due to more inelastic responses and larger 
local, regional and economy-wide economic impacts (Pérez-Blanco, Standardi, Mysiak, 
Parrado, & Gutiérrez-Martín, 2016). Eventually, higher levies may lead to capital losses (e.g. 
perennial plants) and, in some cases, to farm exit (Wheeler, Loch, Zuo, & Bjornlund, 2014). 
In compliance with Article 9 of the WFD, charges should anticipate environmental and eco-
nomic tipping points through a transformational and proactive approach. Yet, the transaction 
costs associated with transforming institutions are not negligible and can block transition 
– calling for complementary (economic) instruments.
Payment for ecosystem services
Initially set up to communicate the role that ecosystems play in human well-being 
(Armsworth et al., 2007), PES schemes have developed over the last three decades into a 
powerful tool for economic decision making on ecosystem services (Engel, Pagiola, & 
Wunder, 2008; Gómez-Baggethun, de Groot, Lomas, & Montes, 2010; Landell-Mills & Porras, 
2005; Pagiola, 2008; Pagiola & Platais, 2007; Wunder, 2015). PES schemes are defined as 
voluntary and conditional transactions over well-defined ecosystem services between at 
least one supplier and one user (Wunder, 2005), following the rationale that the 
Figure 2.  timeline of water allocation reforms and introduction of economic instruments across case 
studies.
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beneficiaries of service provision compensate the providers (Gómez-Baggethun et al., 
2010). The ecosystem services that relate to freshwater resources encompass ‘the benefits 
to people that are produced by terrestrial-ecosystem effects on freshwater’ (Brauman, 
Daily, Duarte, & Mooney, 2007, p. 66). Such benefits can be categorized into four groups: 
provisioning, e.g. in-stream water supply; regulating, e.g. water purification; supporting, 
e.g. maintenance of aquatic habitats that produce services; and cultural, e.g. recreation 
(Reynaud & Lanzanova, 2017). PES schemes can be government-financed (buyer as third 
party), private-user-financed (buyer as end-user) or utility-financed (buyer confronted 
with user fees or tariffs from a public or regulated private utility) (Porras, Alyward, & Dengel, 
2013).
PES schemes have been widely implemented outside Europe (e.g. Asquith, Vargas, & 
Wunder, 2008; Brouwer, Tesfaye, Pauw, & Pepping, 2011; Kosoy, Martinez-Tuna, Muradian, 
& Martínez-Alier, 2007; Martín-Ortega, Ojea, & Roux, 2013; Pagiola, 2008; Postel & Thompson, 
2005; Wunder & Albán, 2008) and to a growing extent within Europe; they exist in all case 
studies reported here. PES schemes have been promoted in the EU Biodiversity Strategy 
to 2020, and their potential is further highlighted in the Roadmap to a Resource Efficient 
Europe (EC, 2015). But the success of such schemes is highly dependent on the political, 
socio-cultural and institutional context in which they are implemented (Muradian et al., 
2013). Key factors for their success include the following (OECD, 2010). The first is a well- 
defined framework. Most importantly, the goals to be achieved by implementing the PES 
scheme should be clearly defined and agreed to by the different participants. It is also 
important also to have initial property rights clearly defined, along with who is able to sell, 
and who would like to buy. Clear insight into the sellers and buyers, their objectives and 
their means of finance is a third factor that defines the success of a PES. Finally, a robust 
framework for monitoring and evaluation not only facilitates the endurance of a PES system 
but also enables PES systems to act as exemplar studies and may boost implementation in 
other areas.
A number of factors/threats must also be accounted for or dealt with to maximize PES 
financial efficiency. First, potential perverse incentives should be dealt with. Moreover, the 
potential of social inefficiency and lack of additionality as obstacles that PES programmes 
might experience, while emphasizing the importance of targeting applicants to maximize 
PES’ financial efficiency (Engel et al., 2008; Ferraro, Pattanayak, Demmer, Starkey, & Telfer, 
2006).
In England, recent studies (Defra, 2013; Reed et al., 2013) have summarized successful 
PES schemes relating to the supply of freshwater resources. For example, SCaMP I (north-
west England), Upstream Thinking (south-west England) and Wessex Water (south-west 
England) were all set up to improve water quality via land management measures targeting 
farmers in each catchment area (Defra, 2013). In France, Vittel (Nestlé Waters) serves as a 
best-practice example. To improve water quality, Vittel signed contracts with other farmers 
to use more sustainable dairy farming techniques and to improve farm facilities (Perrot-
Maître, 2006). Pure PES schemes (buyer as end-user) do not exist in the water sector in Italy 
(Pettenella, Vidale, Gatto, & Secco, 2012), but PES-like schemes driven by public authorities 
are well established, related to hydropower generation, tap-water provision and mineral 
water supply. PES in Italy were set up to compensate the water opportunity costs for local 
populations and to enhance water quantity and/or quality via changing land (here: forest) 
management practices (Pettenella et al., 2012). Multiple examples also exist of recently 
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implemented PES(-like) schemes in the Netherlands targeting water quality and/or quantity 
(Franken, Van Der Meulen, Kwakernaak, Bos, & Lenselink, 2016; Linderhof, De Blaeij, & Polman, 
2009; van der Meulen, Neubauer, Brils, & Borowski, 2012; Verburg & Seines, 2014). Visitor 
payback schemes are applied, for example, in Nationaal Park de Hoge Veluwe, while financial 
payment schemes exist between the Dutch government and various water supply utilities 
(WaterNet, PWN, Vitens) to support their land and water management practices in nature 
areas (Verburg & Seines, 2014). In Spain, significant investments are being made to put 
buyback schemes in place (€ 829.9 million for 2007–2027) in, for example, the Upper Júcar 
River basin, the Segura River basin (Garrido, Rey, & Calatrava, 2012), and the Upper Guadiana 
River basin (Pérez-Blanco & Gutiérrez-Martín, 2017). These aim to restore environmental 
flows while overcoming resistance from farmers through financial compensation and com-
pensating for other possible negative feedbacks (Garrido et al., 2012). These examples high-
light the added value of PES in identifying integrated solutions, providing new funding 
streams for measures that are otherwise difficult to finance, and providing broader support 
for management and policy by the general public. PES schemes are also perceived as more 
flexible, more easily applied and more cost-effective than other instruments, like com-
mand-and-control measures (Ferraro & Simpson, 2002), although ex-post evaluations are 
often lacking.
Non-monetary voluntary agreements
Voluntary agreements, negotiated among agents, rely on truly voluntary (i.e. excluding 
rewards, penalties and other regulated obligations) and non-monetary incentives (as 
opposed to PES) to take action or adopt practices that benefit agents individually while 
contributing to solving water-allocation issues (Lago et al., 2015). Voluntary agreements are 
a common practice in solving water allocation problems in Europe, where markets are rare 
and pecuniary compensation is unfeasible in most settings, following the polluter-pays prin-
ciple (Lindhout & Van den Broek, 2014). In Spain, users and institutions in the drought com-
mission of a river basin authority can negotiate and voluntarily agree on restrictions or 
alternative measures to apply during drought events (Carmona et al., 2017). If the board fails 
to achieve an ecological status in compliance with predefined minimum thresholds, then a 
conventional command-and-control approach is typically adopted (Bielza, Conte, Dittmann, 
Gallego, & Stroblmair, 2008), which usually results in less efficient allocation of the resource 
and higher losses. After a 12-year experiment in the Po River Basin District, Italy has recently 
validated the use of voluntary agreements and is now transitioning from a conventional 
command-and-control to a mixed approach across all its river basins. In England, during 
recent drought events (e.g., 2010–12), the Environment Agency and farmers agreed on vol-
untary restrictions on abstraction for irrigation to avoid further mandatory restrictions in 
the worst-hit areas of the country (Rey et al., 2017).
Voluntary agreements also work as a tool for water management at the local level, most 
notably among irrigators, who typically reallocate water during dry periods through collec-
tive negotiations via farmer associations. This provides additional flexibility and the option 
to mitigate losses as opposed to a proportional reduction in water allotments. An example 
is the French Single Collective Water Management Association, which defines the rules for 
reallocating water among its users within the maximum threshold set by the local water 
committees or public institutions on a common agreement. The requirement to create a 
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Single Collective Water Management Association to control water withdrawals for irrigation 
is imposed by the regulation in areas of structural deficit, but it opens the way to voluntary 
agreements negotiated among the farmers, as they have the freedom to decide on the 
allocation and management rules of the association. These associations also benefit from 
incentives from the local authorities in the form of reduced water charges.
Voluntary agreements can also be used for the adoption of innovative transformational 
solutions that create win-win opportunities, such as green infrastructure and nature-based 
solutions. Evidence shows that when technological, institutional and/or legal barriers fade, 
users have incentives to engage in agreements for their adoption, in several cases due to 
the relevant non-monetary benefits expected, such as better qualitative and quantitative 
status of water bodies (e.g. Baró et al., 2016; Demuzere et al., 2014; Mazza et al., 2011). For 
example, research conducted in the Lower Ebro River in Spain showed that the release of 
artificial pulse floods by the hydropower operator to partially restore the river regime could 
also mitigate the clogging of intakes for hydropower generation at a lower cost than con-
ventional mechanical removal methods (Gómez, Pérez-Blanco, & Batalla, 2014). In England, 
such voluntary agreements have been observed among farmers and water utilities to limit 
the use of fertilizers and improve water quality, as in the agreement between Wessex Water 
and farmers in Dorset (Viavattene, McCarthy, Green, & Pardoe, 2015).
Subsidies
Subsidies are used to enhance the provision of positive externalities, as they help reduce 
production costs, shift supply downwards, reduce prices, and increase the number of goods 
traded and related externalities. During water shortages, over-allocation can result in a neg-
ative externality. Following economic theory, this problem is best addressed through charges 
that make the polluter pay. However, other factors, such as actions from relevant groups of 
interest or affordability issues, can lead policy makers to adopt alternative solutions (Rausser 
et al., 2011). This political economy of water helps explain why, while water charges are rarely 
used to recover environmental and resource costs, subsidies to water-reliant activities are 
the most widespread economic instrument for water management in Europe (European 
Environment Agency, 2013; OECD, 2013), despite a dubious contribution to achieving water 
policy objectives (EC, 2012a).
Subsidies can be explicit, through price support, subsidized loans and direct payments; 
or implicit, through reduced regulation and/or tax or charges relief. Implicit subsidies in 
Europe are typically exerted through insufficient cost recovery at different levels (water 
works, environmental and resource costs), with loose monitoring and enforcement of allo-
cations. Cost recovery of resource and opportunity costs is reported to be inadequate and 
represents an ‘environmentally-harmful subsidy’ (EC, 2012a, p. 10) in all EU member states. 
Cost-recovery levels for water works, which in the UK and the Netherlands are close to 100%, 
range between 60% and 80% for households and around 50% for irrigation in Spain and 
Italy (EEA, 2013). Poor monitoring and enforcement also make illegal withdrawals inexpen-
sive (these are forms of subsidy) and can aggravate water availability problems. For example, 
in one of the most over-exploited basins in Europe, the Segura River basin (Spain), the area 
of irrigated land grew by 6,500 ha/y between 1990 and 2000, a surprising figure considering 
that the granting of new concessions had been forbidden by law since 1986 due to persistent 
over-exploitation problems (WWF, 2006). Some estimates suggest that up to 40% of the 
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irrigated area in the most water-scarce areas in the basin was informal (Pérez-Blanco & 
Gómez, 2013).
Explicit subsidies are also widespread in Europe, particularly in the agricultural sector (EU, 
2003, 2013b). Together with tariffs to protect farmers from cheaper imports, the CAP histor-
ically relied on price supports through purchases of surplus food and minimum price thresh-
olds (EU, 2003). The artificially high prices encouraged food surpluses, increased demand 
for agricultural inputs such as water, and depleted EU financial and natural resources. The 
cost and inefficiency of the policy eventually led to the substitution of price supports by 
direct payments, a process known as decoupling.
Another explicit subsidy that has played a major role in Europe and elsewhere is subsi-
dized loans, typically used to engage farmers in irrigation modernization programmes. The 
largest irrigation modernization programme in Europe took place in Spain, with a total 
investment of € 7368 million between 2002 and 2008, of which 60.1% was via public funds 
and 39.9% privately funded. The objective was to save 3,662 hm3 water annually through 
reduced water withdrawals (López-Gunn, Mayor, & Dumont, 2012). However, evidence clearly 
shows that this investment, together with other irrigation programmes, has not reduced 
pressures on water bodies (Berbel & Mateos, 2014; Rodríguez Díaz et al., 2012). A recent 
study reviewing international evidence concluded that ‘reductions in water consumption 
by irrigated agriculture will not come from the technology itself’, and that other instruments 
‘like limiting water allocation will be needed to ensure a sustainable level of water use’ (Food 
and Agriculture Organization, 2017, p. v).
The Tinbergen principle states that to achieve targets for a certain number of objectives, 
an equal number of instruments is necessary. Of equal importance, the Tinbergen principle 
also stated that the design of a successful policy requires a clear differentiation between the 
objective, namely the variables policy makers want to affect, and the variables that the policy 
maker can control directly or instrument (Tinbergen, 1952). The assignment principle states 
that policy makers should assign each instrument to the pursuit of a specific policy target, 
and avoid using that instrument to pursue a second target (Mundell, 1960, 1962). The under-
performance, if not failure, of subsidies in Europe seems to validate these principles. Implicit 
subsidies and subsidized loans for irrigation modernization pursue the double objective of 
reducing water use while guaranteeing a stable income to farmers (one instrument, two 
targets), but evidence shows they succeed only in the latter – at a higher cost than available 
alternatives. The transition from price supports to direct payments tackles the problem of 
income stability in a more effective way (income instability is not only explained by prices, 
but also production volatility), while avoiding negative feedbacks on the environment. 
Ultimately, restoring the balance in over-exploited basins demands instruments specifically 
designed to reduce use; these can be complemented with others that then address distrib-
utive issues and compensate those who lose out (Young, 2014).
Water trading
A water market can be defined as ‘an institutional framework which allows water right hold-
ers, under certain established rules, to transfer their rights to other economic agents or water 
users, receiving an economic compensation in exchange’ (Sumpsi, Garrido, Blanco, Varela, 
& Iglesias, 1998, p. 73). In water-scarce areas such as Australia, California, Spain and Chile, 
water markets have been used to buy back water for the environment, to increase reliability 
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of urban water supply, and to reallocate water from low-value to high-value crops (Garrido 
& Gomez-Ramos, 2009; Grafton, Landry, Libecap, McGlennon, & Brien, 2010; Hanak & 
Jezdimirovic, 2016; Palomo-Hierro, Gómez-Limón, & Riesgo, 2015; Wheeler et al., 2014). With 
the expected effects of climate change on water supplies and demands looming, some 
authors have referred to water markets as a cost-efficient adaptation mechanism in Europe 
(Escriva-Bou, Pulido-Velazquez, & Pulido-Velazquez, 2017). However, water markets can also 
generate significant damage to local economies that has to be accounted for and mitigated 
if necessary (Doherty & Smith, 2012). Therefore, clarity in water rights and a sound regulatory 
framework are essential for a successful water market (Wheeler, Loch, Crase, Young, & Grafton, 
2017).
The five case studies presented here illustrate a variety of contrasting situations. In Spain, 
water markets have been fully developed, although they are spatially and temporarily limited 
and conditioned to a formal enactment by royal decree. In England, trading is possible but 
not widespread, although there is increasing interest, given growing pressures on water 
bodies. In France and Italy, trading is not allowed, and legal and political reasoning have 
prevented its implementation. In the Netherlands, trading is not currently permitted, and 
its implementation has not been recently discussed.
Water trading was the centrepiece of the 1999 reform of the Water Act in Spain (Boletín 
Oficial del Estado, 1999). The reform included two ways to exchange public water use rights: 
right-holders that voluntarily agree on specific terms of trade and jointly file a request to 
lease out for a number of years the water to which right-holders are entitled; and water banks 
(or water exchange centres, as they are called in the 1999 Water Act), a clearinghouse for 
buyers and sellers (Garrido et al., 2012). Prior to this reform only private rights could be for-
mally traded; water flows pumped from private wells could be leased, auctioned or sold (Rey, 
2014). Following the 1999 reform, several water rights exchanges have taken place in the 
Spanish territory, involving different water users, water sources and basins. However, the 
overall performance of water markets in Spain has been below expectations (Garrido et al., 
2012). Water markets have been operative only during drought periods, and even then, trad-
ing activity accounted for less than 5% of total water use (Palomo-Hierro et al., 2015). Various 
barriers to trade have been identified in Spain, including lack of information; high transaction 
costs; temporal limitations of trading allowances; lack of certainty and property right pro-
tection in the definition of water rights; and a lack of clarity in the conditions under which 
exchanges involving more than one region could be made (Calatrava & Martínez-Granados, 
2017; Palomo-Hierro et al., 2015; Rey, 2014; Wheeler et al., 2017). Informal water markets also 
exist in Spain, particularly in areas of intense water scarcity and high-economic-value water 
uses, like the Mediterranean south-eastern coast. They have been developed mostly at the 
local scale through a variety of institutional arrangements, which do not always clearly align 
with current legislation (Hernández-Mora & Del Moral, 2015).
In England, the transfer of rights between licence holders is possible but not straightfor-
ward. Short-term exchanges are de facto unfeasible under standard procedures due to the 
time required for approval. Several barriers to trade have been identified (Environment 
Agency & Ofwat, 2008), including lack of a visible market; an inability to see the value added 
in trading; lack of understanding of the process; hoarding for future uncertainty; the exist-
ence of alternatives to trading; the feasibility of making suitable trades; the restrictions 
placed on trading and the reduction of rights at the point of trade; the difficulty and com-
plexity of the trading process; and broader barriers which prevent the market from 
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developing, for example obstacles to upstream competition, such as the current access price. 
Since then, other studies have been undertaken to inform abstraction licensing reforms, and 
to improve basin interconnections, in order to enhance water trading (Cave, 2009; Defra, 
2011; House of Commons, 2012).
In Italy and France, water trading faces significant opposition, substantiated through legal 
and political barriers. In Italy, a referendum in 2011 rejected a legislative decree (3 April 2006, 
n. 152, Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italia, 2006), which would have introduced the 
option to ‘adequately’ remunerate capital investments by water utilities and managers. Its 
revocation complicates the introduction of marketable permits in the Italian context. In 
France, the Social and Economic Council concluded in 1991 that water markets are not 
desirable in France as they conflict with the understanding of water as more than a purely 
economic good. Since then, the establishment of tradable quotas has been investigated 
and evaluated in different contexts and through different formats to highlight its potential 
benefits in France (Rinaudo, Montginoul, Varanda, & Bento, 2012; Strosser & Montginoul, 
2001). However, it has not been implemented until now, mainly due to farmers’ rejection 
and political reluctance (Figureau, Montginoul, & Rinaudo, 2015; Montginoul & Rinaudo, 
2009). Finally, cultural, social, legal, institutional and physical infrastructure barriers have 
collectively limited the implementation of water trading mechanisms. Designing efficient 
market institutions to replace traditional water allocation rules is understandably a chal-
lenging exercise (Garrido, 2007).
Insurance
Water stocks underground are a de facto insurance against droughts in the absence of 
financial arrangements. This is the case in many agricultural basins in the Mediterranean 
area, where water deficit during drought periods is (partially) covered through (illegal) 
over-abstraction, mostly from dependable aquifers that are difficult to monitor (Perez-Blanco 
& Gomez, 2014). Although crop insurance might not be an economic instrument for water 
management per se, it could play a key role in addressing the incentives towards aquifer 
overdraft during dry periods. The EU has adopted mostly classic agricultural insurance 
schemes, with commercial insurance usually supplied by private insurers, except in Greece 
and Cyprus, where insurance is supplied by the public sector (Bielza et al., 2008). Drought 
insurance coverage in Europe has traditionally been limited. Until recently, only insurance 
schemes in Spain, Italy, France and Austria have compensated drought-related losses in 
rainfed agriculture. Emerging mutual funds that hedge policyholders against income (instead 
of yield) losses, and thus provide drought coverage also in irrigated agriculture, have been 
subsidized by the EU CAP European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development since 2014. 
The fund offers compensation for up to 65% of the indemnities paid, provided that (1) the 
indemnities compensate for less than 70% of the foregone income, and (2) the income drop 
is above 30% of a three-year average based on the preceding three years or the five-year 
period excluding the highest and lowest entry annual income (EU, 2013c). Mutual funds are 
also eligible for EU financial contributions related to the administrative costs of setting up 
the mutual fund, and to financial contributions to premiums for crop insurance against 
several risks (including adverse climatic events or outbreak of a disease or pest infestation 
or an environmental incident which destroys more than 30% of the average annual produc-
tion of a farmer in a three-year period).
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF WATER RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT  223
Spain and Italy have taken relevant steps to insure irrigated agriculture against drought 
losses. In Spain, an extensive and heavily subsidized insurance programme hedges farmers 
against the main natural risks, e.g., hail, frost and flood (Antón & Kimura, 2011).The pro-
gramme is subsidized by the Ministry of Agriculture and (to a lesser extent) by regional 
governments. Costs are subsidized by up to 45%, depending on the type of commodity and 
the terms of the contract (Meuwissen, Huirne, & Skees, 2003). The implementation of drought 
insurance policies in irrigated agriculture through traditional yield insurance (Perez-Blanco 
& Gomez, 2014), index-based insurance (Maestro, Bielza, & Garrido, 2016; Ruiz, Bielza, Garrido, 
& Iglesias, 2015), and income insurance (Pérez-Blanco, Delacámara, & Gómez, 2015) has been 
explored by a series of studies commissioned by the pool of agricultural insurance firms and 
the Ministry of Agriculture over the last decade, but it still represents a challenge for com-
panies and institutions because of the complexity of its design and implementation (Maestro 
et al., 2016; Ruiz et al., 2015).
Conversely, Italy has pioneered the development and support of mutual funds in Europe: 
Decree 102/2004 (Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italia, 2004) and Law 388/2000 (Gazzetta 
Ufficiale della Repubblica Italia, 2000) established that mutual funds constituted by the so-called 
Comisioni di Difesa (Defense Commission) were eligible for public funding. As a result, mutual 
funds emerged in Italy even without public support in different agricultural sub-sectors. 
Although they did not receive final approval from the European Commission, the new CAP 
2014-2020 is likely to relaunch mutual funds and increase their (still marginal) relevance.
Policy recommendations: enablers and barriers for implementation, and 
transferability
As highlighted above, it is critical to carefully study the multiple aspects and dimensions 
relating to the implementation of economic instruments as a tool for water allocation reform. 
First, it is necessary to recognize the strengths of each economic instrument and its potential 
to contribute to the reform objectives. Second, it is critical to identify the barriers that might 
inhibit the success of the instrument. Third, it is essential to consider all the unintended 
consequences that economic instruments can create in the water-allocation regime. The 
comparative analysis of the strengths, barriers and unintended consequences of existing 
economic instruments within different socio-economic, legal, institutional and biophysical 
contexts in the selected case-study areas helps elicit underlying common guidelines that 
can determine success. Table 3 highlights the main strengths, barriers and unintended con-
sequences based on a comprehensive review of European experiences, together with specific 
recommendations.
Drawing from our analysis and Table 3, we formulate below a series of recommendations 
to inform the implementation of economic instruments in water allocation reform in Europe, 
and elsewhere.
Regulatory framework
Water rights are the heart of any allocation system, and essential for successful reallocation 
(Meinzen-Dick & Bakker, 2000; Pigram, 1999). As long as the resource is plentiful, there is 
little pressure to define or enforce water rights. When water becomes scarcer and competi-
tion for it increases, as is happening in most countries around Europe (see section on water 
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resource pressures), property rights can clarify expectations, limit uncertainty and reduce 
conflicts (Bruns & Meinzen-Dick, 2005). As summarized in Table 1, each case study has a 
different allocation system designed for its specific context. A major problem is that, currently, 
around the world water is often allocated based on institutions established when water was 
not considered a scarce resource (Frederick, 2001). There is a need for well-defined property 
rights such that they are completely specified, monitored, enforceable, transferable and 
legally secured (Saliba & Bush, 1987). In order to do so, we need to ensure the following.
Rights should account for hydrological variability and dynamics, and be defined as shares of 
harvestable resources to ensure flexibility and legal security. Rights should be ‘consistent with 
the way water is stored, and how it flows through landscapes’, accounting for return (and 
escape) flows, connectivity between water bodies, and environmental uses (Young, 2014, 
p. 34). Rights need to be defined as shares of harvestable resources, rather than in absolute 
terms, as is the case in Europe now (OECD, 2015a). In this context, risk assignment and man-
agement is also critical: if users are assigned 100% of water supply risk (no compensation is 
provided in the event of a drought), planning is likely to lead to dynamically efficient out-
comes. On the other hand, full risk assignment may be undesirable, if not unfeasible, in the 
EU context, which has solidarity among its essential values (EU, 2012).
Water entitlements should be separated from land. The Tinbergen and assignment principles 
imply that an accurate and successful policy design necessitates one instrument for the 
pursuit of each objective. A prerequisite for correct policy design is thus de jure differenti-
ation between land and water rights so that agricultural and water policy objectives are 
achieved through ad hoc instruments designed in an efficient and effective way. A clear 
example of this problem is the reacquisition of water rights in the Guadiana River basin in 
Spain. Since the right to use water in Spain is bundled with the land, policy makers addressed 
this shortcoming by targeting the land market and acquiring land rights instead of water 
rights (Garrido et al., 2012). Of the water rights bought, 85% were ‘paper rights’ not exercised 
by users, which consequently did not contribute to solving the over-allocation problem. 
Despite some other issues (see below), the Australian buyback scheme successfully unbun-
dled water from land and managed to develop a water market to address overcompensation 
in agricultural water buyback more effectively (Iftekhar, Tisdell, & Connor, 2013).
Thresholds for water licenses should refer to consumption, not only withdrawals. Following 
efficiency improvements, any potential ‘real water saving’ that enhances environmental flows 
(Perry, 2011) can be offset by the incentive to increase income through higher water con-
sumption (i.e. the water fraction that evapotranspires), even if withdrawals decrease (Gómez 
& Pérez-Blanco, 2014; Huffaker, 2008). Evidence on irrigation modernization programmes 
from countries like the United States (Pfeiffer & Lin, 2014; Scheierling, Young, & Cardon, 2006), 
Australia (Adamson & Loch, 2014; Grafton, 2017), China (Kendy, Molden, Steenhuis, & Liu, 
2003), Tanzania (Lankford, 2004), Pakistan (Ahmad, Turral, Masih, Giordano, & Masood, 2007), 
and Spain and other Mediterranean countries (Food and Agriculture Organization, 2017), 
among others, shows that this apparently paradoxical outcome is the norm unless restric-
tions on consumptive use are established. Adequate monitoring and return-flow accounting, 
complemented with a sensible regulatory framework that limits consumptive use, is neces-
sary to prevent depletion of water bodies. This holds for almost every situation with the 
exception of escape-flow regimes (i.e. water flows to a sink; Huffaker, Whittlesey, & Huffaker, 
2003).
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Legal uncertainty on the conflict between the polluter-pays principle and the beneficiary-pays 
principle deserves careful consideration. Although the polluter-pays principle pervades envi-
ronmental legislation, differing interpretations of the legal acquis have resulted in a benefit- 
based approach. Examples of this interpretation plague water realpolitik in Europe and 
elsewhere. For example, multi-million-dollar investments have been recently committed to 
water buyback in areas such as Australia’s Murray-Darling Basin (AUD 3.1 billion for 2009–24), 
south-east Spain (€ 829.9 million for 2007–27) and in the US, notably California (USD 547 
million during 1987–2011, 55% of which after 2003) (Department of Sustainability, 
Environment, Water, Population and Communities, 2016). The fairness of the beneficiary-pays 
approach is questionable, despite its pragmatism, and EU institutions seem committed to 
advancing towards a full-fledged polluter-pays principle in Europe (Lindhout & Van den 
Broek, 2014). A recent example involves a ruling by the National Court of Spain (Tribunal 
Supremo) against the Jucar River Basin Management Plan because it asked municipalities 
to pay for the cost of changing their water supply source from ground to surface water, 
which was necessitated by farmers polluting the groundwater source with nitrates and pes-
ticides (Boletín Oficial del Estado, 2017).
Development of a public register to enhance transparency. Its absence is often cited as one 
of the causes of water resource over-allocation (Bruns & Meinzen-Dick, 2005). In the Po River 
Basin District in Italy, the amount of resources allocated through water rights is often loosely 
defined (e.g. average withdrawals) or not specified at all, and metering devices are often not 
in place. The absence of accessible registers complicates the implementation of environ-
mental impact assessments for new licences and prevents prioritization of uses according 
to their full economic value. This has resulted in a de jure over-allocation, which does not 
translate into de facto scarcity due to the large number of sleeping licences (Santato et al., 
2016), although most recently increasingly intense and recurrent droughts have made this 
problem apparent (Castellari et al., 2014). In Australia, those basins where water trading 
activity has not developed significantly are the ones where public registers, trading platforms 
and market information are also less developed (Defra, 2012), suggesting that revealing the 
full economic value of water may underpin the development of registers.
Integration of economic instruments into broader water policies
Economic instruments are a means to an end. Any private gain through the deployment of 
economic instruments should be accompanied by societal gains through the achievement 
of water policy objectives (incentive compatibility). This is illustrated for instance in the 
implementation of PES schemes in the Netherlands, UK, France, and Italy (see review of PES 
in previous section) and outside Europe (e.g., Martín-Ortega et al., 2013), where farmers have 
been compensated for reducing or avoiding fertilizer application and guaranteeing water 
quality in specific areas based on the avoided cost for water utilities and expected societal 
environmental benefits.
Economic instruments cannot be designed in isolation but only in combination with other 
tools and policies. They must be enhanced and promoted through complementary measures 
that guarantee their success and avoid externalities, relying on the Tinbergen and assignment 
principles. The Australian reform is often cited as an example of international best practices 
in this regard (OECD, 2015a), and recent guidelines for water policy reform in the UK and 
western US states took stock from them (Young, 2012, 2015).
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Policy sequencing should be carefully designed to enhance cost-effectiveness. Several studies 
of buyback programmes in the US, Spain and Australia suggest that the cost of the policy 
is likely to increase where water markets among private users are in place and the full eco-
nomic value of water has been revealed, thus hampering cost-effectiveness (Hanak & 
Stryjewski, 2012; Iftekhar et al., 2013; Pérez-Blanco & Gutiérrez-Martín, 2017). An example 
of cost-effective combination and sequencing of water policies is given by voluntary agree-
ments (see review of this instrument in previous section) established among stakeholders 
of drought commissions in Spain, which allow for cost-effective agreements prior to the 
implementation of a command-and-control approach; or in the case of the French water 
users’ association, where water abstractions reforms set up the conditions for the imple-
mentation of economic instruments among water users, but leave them the autonomy to 
decide on the type of instruments they want to implement within their association to comply 
with targets while minimising losses.
Avoidance of undesirable outcomes
Economic instruments might create undesired externalities. To avoid these undesirable out-
comes, all the potential socio-economic and environmental effects have to be properly 
evaluated and, if possible, avoided. In cases where third-party effects are identified but 
unavoidable, mitigation strategies are necessary to reallocate policy benefits and/or to avoid 
inequitable outcomes. Table 3 summarizes the main negative externalities of economic 
instruments in the case studies. These unintended consequences are specific to each context 
and instrument, although some general recommendations can be drawn.
Economic instruments, and water policy overall, should be carefully designed to avoid unin-
tended socio-economic (notably redistributive) and environmental consequences. In places like 
California and Spain, water reallocation and more specifically trading are subject to the 
primary restriction of the ‘no-injury rule’: a water transfer must not result in an injury to other 
legal uses of water. Typically this means that water right holders may transfer only the amount 
of water that results from a reduction in the consumptive use of their water right (Escriva-
bou, Mccann, Hanak, Lund, & Jezdimirovic, 2016). Socio-economic consequences might arise 
from water transfers if there is an economic activity linked to the water traded. These effects 
need to be properly assessed. The substantial search and information, bargaining and policy 
enforcement costs involved in the process have led the Spanish administration to apply the 
rule of ‘positive silence’ (Williamson, 1998), meaning that if no response is provided in a given 
period of time, the reallocation can take place – a major loophole which traders have often 
resorted to, as in the Tagus-Segura inter-basin trading scheme (Delacámara, Pérez-Blanco, 
Ibáñez, & Gómez, 2015b).
Where third-party effects are properly identified but unavoidable, mitigation strategies are 
necessary to reallocate policy benefits and/or to avoid inequitable outcomes. Where the policy 
benefits are greater than the unavoidable damages, or inequitable outcomes result from 
the reallocation of water, monetary (or other type of ) compensation should be established. 
As an example, the Metropolitan Water District and the Palo Verde Irrigation District, both 
in Southern California, established a USD 6 million local development fund to mitigate the 
impact of the water transfer on the Palo Verde Valley, after signing a 35-year agreement to 
fallow annually between 2,400 and 107,000 hectares of Palo Verde Irrigation District land, 
depending on Metropolitan Water District needs (Doherty & Smith, 2012). In the Upper 
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Guadiana in Spain, water reallocation from agriculture to the environment through the buy-
back programme (€829.9 million) was complemented with €2.1 billion for diverse flanking 
measures to subsidize economic diversification and new transportation, communication 
and energy infrastructure that mitigated negative spillover on the local economy 
(Confederación Hidrográfica del Guadiana, 2008).
Institutional capability
The implementation of economic instruments demands knowledge of the costs and benefits 
of economic instruments for users (including the environment) and other affected agents 
locally and in the wider economy; but also of the laws, the customs and the political power 
balance that define transaction costs and the range of actions that institutions can realisti-
cally implement. To this end, the total cost of implementing economic instruments should 
be assessed by aggregating the net costs to users and third-party effects, and institutional 
transaction costs (Marshall, 2013). Yet, although some recent studies have measured the 
transaction costs of water policy reform in the US, Australia and South Africa, there is still no 
empirical base on these costs in Europe (Garrick, McCann, & Pannell, 2013).
Stakeholder engagement and transparency
The declaration of the Dublin Principles in 1992 at the International Conference on Water 
and the Environment clearly stated the important role of participatory approaches in water 
management. According to Integrated Water Resources Management principles, water devel-
opment and management should be based on a participatory approach, involving users, 
planners and policy makers at all levels (Solanes, 1998). Early engagement and transparent 
and accountable decision making are key to acceptability (Delacámara et al., 2014; 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2015b). For instance, in England, 
abstraction reform is being designed through consultation with stakeholders (Defra, 2016a).
Stakeholder engagement in the design and use of economic instruments to achieve the policy 
goal is essential. Economic instruments are often misunderstood and hindered by miscon-
ceptions. Lack of understanding of the aims, features and outcomes of economic instruments 
could hinder their success. This has been the case for water trading in many parts of the 
world, where water users are hesitant to participate in the market due to a lack of under-
standing of the system and the fear that their water licence must be reviewed by the water 
authority if they are selling the water to someone else (Garrido et al., 2012).
Transparency, including the provision of useful and timely data and information, can help 
eliminate barriers. Apart from reducing over-abstraction and over-allocation, a central register 
of water use and the encouragement of metering will help reduce stakeholders’ reluctance 
towards economic instruments.
Conclusions
The water scarcity- and drought-related challenges we face today should be interpreted as 
a problem of governance, which is being and will be further aggravated by climate change. 
Sensible and conscientious concerted action is necessary to achieve the greatest collective 
good through economic instruments for water management. Economic instruments are 
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gaining momentum in European countries with different water-scarcity levels, allocation 
systems and regulations, revealing common and site-specific challenges that need to be 
addressed to ensure a meaningful contribution to water policy objectives and a successful 
implementation.
This study first reviewed the performance of economic instruments in water allocation 
reform against original design objectives in five European countries: England, France, Italy, 
Spain and the Netherlands. It then identified the strengths of, barriers to and unintended 
consequences of economic instruments within the varying socio-economic, legal, institu-
tional and biophysical contexts in the case-study areas, and drew out underlying common 
guidelines and general recommendations.
These guidelines and recommendations respond to our assessment of European case 
studies, but also consider experiences in other parts of the world (especially California and 
Australia). These guidelines and recommendations offer valuable insights to inform the 
mainstreaming of economic instruments in water allocation reform processes elsewhere in 
Europe, and also in other countries or international river basins with similar characteristics. 
Our study reveals that there is no ‘fit-for-all’ solution to water-allocation challenges, and 
every economic instrument for water management has strengths and limitations that have 
to be accounted for when redesigning allocation systems. Furthermore, economic instru-
ments are not panaceas to address the challenges at hand; quite the contrary, they should 
be designed considering the particularities of the study area and in concert with regulatory 
and/or engineering solutions where these can enhance their impact or outperform them. 
In the process of designing economic instruments, it is also important to acknowledge the 
bounded rationality of individuals: particularly in the case of water, policy decisions are made 
in a context of (deep) uncertainty and contingent on the institutional infrastructure at hand. 
This makes the involvement of relevant stakeholders of paramount importance, to ensure 
that policy goals and means are the result of consensual agreement in the society and 
coordinated with other policy spheres.
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